Ethiek krijgt plotseling weer de aandacht van Westerse boeddhisten, na jarenlang wat minachtend genegeerd te zijn.
'Aandacht' in Nederland vooral door schade en schande; vergelijk de zaak van de Mettavihari-leraren/leerlingen en nu weer de zaak Nico Tydeman .
De verschillen tussen deze twee cases zijn aanzienlijk, maar hebben een gezamelijke conclusie:
laten we nu het boeddhisme verder zonder leraar beoefenen.
Update 3 november
Om misverstand te voorkomen: ik heb het hier niet over het misbruik door Mettavihari, zijn gedrag was immoreel.
Hier heb het over het jarenlange zwijgen van de leerlingen van Mettavihari en over de zaak Tydeman waarin de manier van redeneren amoreel is. (Wiki: "Iets is immoreel als het ingaat tegen de wetten van de ethiek. Iets is amoreel als het niets met goed of kwaad te maken heeft")
Einde update
Als Nico Tydeman zegt "Ik ben een leerling en volgeling van de Boeddha en ik geef krachtens de lijn van opvolging waarin ik sta, in zijn naam onderricht ", dan zeg ik: dit is niet de Dharma, deze mythe van een lineage, dit is gebaseerd op Oostaziatische voorouderverering.
Er is geen 'lijn van opvolging' ! Vgl Bijlage 1 hieronder over de inzichten van John McRae.
En als Dick Verstegen in het BD van 31 okt zegt "Het staat de leraar als belichaming van de Dharma niet vrij om bij fouten het bijltje erbij neer te gooien", dan vind ik dat misbruik maken van het Dharma-begrip. De implicatie is dat een leraar nooit hoeft af te treden, wat hij (of 'zij', maar het gaat hier bijna altijd om mannen) ook doet: afkeurenswaardige onzin.
Overigens: ik ben geen zennie; of Nico feitelijk als leraar aftreedt of niet gaat mij niet aan, alleen z'n motivering om te blijven (en de verdediging daarvan door anderen) gaat mij aan.
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De lol om in deze Hollandse grauwheid nog over ethiek te schrijven, is er bij mij nu wel af. M'n voornemen uitgebreid op het betoog van Chapman in te gaan, was toch al verminderd omdat ik z'n latere artikelen een stuk minder interessant vond dan z'n eerste.
Daarom low-profile een overzicht van recente Engelstalige teksten; met name van bloggers. Ook al interessant om die te noemen, omdat er in het Nederlandse taalgebied zo weinig en steeds minder belangwekkends verschijnt.
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Niet zozeer als de verdergenoemden inspelend op de actuele discussie binnen het westers boeddhisme noem ik een recente publikatie van de boeddholoog (o.a. vertaler van Nagarjuna) Jay L. Garfield: 'Mindfulness and Ethics - Attention, virtue and perfection ' .
De inhoud: "I will first talk briefly about why mindfulness is so important in Buddhist ethics. I will then shift gears and discuss the importance of spontaneity, first in the Aristotelian and then in the Zen tradition. I will close by showing why that spontaneity can only be understood as desirable if infused by the kind of mindfulness philosophers such as Śāntideva recommend, and why that mindfulness can only be morally efficacious if it suffuses our perception and action so as to render them spontaneous. "
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Blogteksten van Richard Payne zijn altijd de moeite waard. Twee over ethiek:
Eentje uit juni 2015 begint aldus: " Narratives and trajectories: morality and meditation
Last month a post of mine appeared on the Tricycle website. That post is titled “What’s Ethics Got to Do with It?: The Misguided Debate about Mindfulness and Morality.”
Since a superficial reading of the post might lead the incautious to conclude that I was discounting any role for ethics in Buddhist practice, I would like to expand on the conceptual basis of the claims involved. Justin Whitaker made his reservations publicly and examining some of these provide specific points requiring clarification. "
Dit is een uitwerking van een eerder stuk in Tricycle: What's Ethics Got to Do with It?
Dit artikel, ondertitel 'The misguided debate about mindfulness and morality', heb ik (deels) als Bijlage 2 opgenomen.
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Dan Justin Whitaker en zijn blog 'American Buddhist Perspectives '
Schrijft veel over ethiek, bijvoorbeeld: 'Buddhist mindfulness, morality, and Protestant presumptions' in mei 2015
"... But yesterday Tricycle published an article by Richard K. Payne somewhat dismissively subtitled 'The misguided debate about mindfulness and morality.' That could, of course, be a misguided choice of words by an editor, but what follows in the article seems to bear out the sense that Dr. Payne really does think the whole discussion is missing the point ..."
Zie ook zijn zeer uitgesproken reactie op Chapman hieronder.
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Een andere blogger die ik beslist wil noemen, is Jayarava, lid van de Triratna maar ook een autonoom denker.
Schrijft al jarenlang wekelijk een degelijke en soms moeilijke (filologische) blogtekst in Jayarava's Raves
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Te beginnen met het artikel ' “Buddhist ethics” is a fraud ' is David Chapman een paar weken geleden een ijzersterke serie blogteksten over boeddhistische ethiek.
Zie ook de aankondiging in m'n blog van 16 okt , bijlage 3.
Ik geef de links in de volgorde waarin ze gepubliceerd zijn en dus gelezen moeten worden:
* 'buddhist-ethics'-is-a-fraud
* 'buddhist-ethics'-is-not-buddhist-ethics
* traditional-buddhism-has-no-ethical-system
* buddhist-morality-is-medieval
* how-asian-buddhism-imported-western-ethics
* why-westerners-rebranded-secular-ethics-as-'buddhist'-and-banned-tantra
* ftfy-buddhist-ethics
* 'buddhist-ethics'-is-advertising
* the-mindfulness-crisis-and-the-end-of-consensus-buddhism
* 'buddhist-ethics'-a-tantric-critique
* developing-ethical-social-and-cognitive-competence
* better-buddhisms-a-developmental-approach
* consensus-buddhism-whats-left
In z'n eerste artikel geeft hij een overzicht; de titels heeft hij soms een beetje gewijzigd en de laatste twee zijn vervangen door 'whats left', dat is jammer en voor mij een beetje een anticlimax.
Want z'n betoog was niet dat er te weinig ethiek is in het 'Westers boeddhisme', door hem 'Consensus buddhism' genoemd, maar dat de inhoud niet veel voorstelt. Dat 'buddhist ethics' van westerse boeddhisten nauwelijks iets anders is dan die van de 'linkse' Californische cultuur in het algemeen. En dat de ethiek van het Aziatische boeddhisme middeleeuws te noemen is.
Dit alles met een uitermate (voor boeddhisten uitzonderlijk) helder taalgebruik.
Z'n overzicht, opgenomen in 'Buddhist ethics' is a fraud:
" 'Buddhist ethics' is not Buddhist ethics: It is indistinguishable from contemporary American leftish public morality. It is not based on the moral teachings of traditional Buddhist authorities. It is also not a valuable, unique innovation; it simply re-labels mainstream secular ethics “Buddhist.”
Traditional Buddhism has no ethical system: It does have lists of good and bad things, but they have no structure or explanations. Karma and compassion are not, and cannot be, foundational principles (despite claims). The various codes of conduct (lay precepts, vinaya, bodhisattva paramitas, samaya) are training disciplines, not ethical systems. None of them contains anything that would come as useful news to Westerners. Traditional Buddhist moral teachings that are correct are all found in other religions, including Christianity.
Traditional Buddhist morality is Medieval: Much of the specific moral content of traditional Buddhism is abhorrent to liberal Western values. I discuss traditional Buddhist sexual morality, the absence of any concept of human rights, and Buddhism’s support for slavery, patriarchy, and wars of conquest.
How Asian Buddhism imported Western ethics: Buddhist modernizers replaced traditional Buddhist morality with Western ethics in three stages, beginning in the 1850s.
How Westerners rebranded secular ethics as “Buddhist” and banned Tantra: Current “Buddhist ethics” dates back only to the late 1980s, when Consensus leaders declared then-current secular morality to be “Buddhist” by fiat. This page discusses their motivations, the history, and one consequence: the banning of modern Buddhist Tantra.
FTFY Buddhist ethics: The rhetorical strategies that explain away traditional Buddhist moral teachings, and disguise Western secular ones as Buddhist.
[ “FTFY” is 2015 internet slang for “fixed that for you.”]
What is “Buddhist ethics” for? It is a pledge of allegiance to left side of the American culture-war split; it is a claim of piety; it is a strategy for gaining higher class status; and it signifies particular personality traits such as openness and agreeableness. This “Buddhist ethics” no longer fools anyone, so it is dying and taking Consensus Buddhism with it. We can do better: better at Buddhism, better at ethics, and better even at claiming personal superiority.
The mindfulness crisis and the end of Consensus Buddhism: Consensus Buddhism recently fought the secular mindfulness movement over “ethics in teaching meditation.” It lost. This suggests that the Consensus’ political domination has ended. The Consensus has done great harm to Western Buddhism by obscuring most of Asian Buddhism. Its loss of power allows alternatives, both traditional and contemporary.
[hieruit heb ik 16 okt in Bijlage 3 een deel geciteerd; Joop R]
“Buddhist ethics”: a Tantric critique: This describes contradictions between contemporary leftish secular morality (a/k/a “Buddhist ethics”) and Buddhist Tantra. It sketches reasons to accept the Tantric view. It points, vaguely and tentatively, at the possibility of a future distinctively Buddhist ethics.
Developing ethical, social, and cognitive competence: I summarize Robert Kegan’s constructive-developmental model, which I consider the best available ethical theory.
Better Buddhisms: a developmental approach: Here I analyze Buddhism in terms of Kegan’s framework, summarized in the previous post. I suggest that “Buddhist ethics” and Consensus Buddhism operate at a merely adolescent level. They are psychologically regressive, hindering personal development. I contrast them with some genuinely adult modern Buddhisms. I sketch possible futures for better Buddhisms that might draw from Kegan’s model.
Emptiness, form, and ethics: The Buddhist idea that form and emptiness are inseparable may help resolve the Western crisis of postmodernity, the impasse between ethical eternalism and ethical nihilism, and the uselessness of contemporary moral philosophy.
Learning how to be kind: Most Buddhists do not lack compassion. What some of us lack are practical skills of kindness: how to actually benefit people. I suggest this is what we most want from “Buddhist ethics.” It cannot deliver—but that doesn’t mean nothing can. I think it’s possible to learn to be kinder; so it may also be possible to teach kindness. I make tentative suggestions for what might be included in such a curriculum. "
Uiteraard riepen de sweeping statements van Chapman veel kommentaar op. In zijn blog zelf, maar ook daar buiten, bv in http://loveofallwisdom.com/blog/2015/10/is-buddhist-ethics-buddhist/
De krachtigste die ik ben tegengekomen is van Justin Whitaker:
"Again, I don’t want to get mired in a kind of point-by-point discussion. I’ll offer a few observations, but really I would prefer others to look closely at the categories and claims in your posts to see how they hold up.
For me, claims such as “Traditional Buddhist morality is obviously wrong,” or that it is “medieval” simply paint with way too broad a brush, as some commenters have kind of picked up on, and when using a term like “medieval” it helps immensely to define just what you mean by it (to art historians it refers to one period of time, to Catholic theologians it means another, and it’s hard to know just what it would mean in the context of Buddhism). “Traditional” is also a term that should be carefully wielded.
You write of the Sigalovada sutta: “It’s an odd document; I’m not sure what to make of it. The central point seems to be “to get to heaven, you need to be rich; here’s how to be rich.”” Then you say it has been ignored by Consensus Buddhism. Who exactly IS Consensus Buddhism? :) I suppose since it’s “Consensus” it should be a large group of teachers or at least many prominent ones, right?
I suppose if I had at least a rough list I could then look up a couple instances where it is not ignored.
It’s actually a really good example of the Buddha introducing his practice, beginning with 4 harmful actions (the first 4 precepts) and then giving a deeper level of justification as to what makes them harmful (acting from desire, anger, ignorance, and fear) and a detailed exposition of the evils of breaking the 5th precept, expanded out to include sauntering in the streets at unseemly hours, gambling, excessive theatre, having evil friends, and idleness… This is all expounded upon at length before a somewhat basic moral sermon on caring for people around you (in the six directions). It really is a beautiful – and relatively simple – sutta.
The idea that tantra was banned is one of the more dubious claims. First, nobody has or had the power to “ban” tantra. Second, the precepts are not commandments, so encouraging that they be taken does not ban or somehow prohibit their being violated. Third, to my knowledge, tantra doesn’t work on the same level of logic or morality as the sutras, so taking the precepts at one level does not mean one cannot engage in practices at another level that might be interpreted as breaking those precepts. Fourth, if there was such a ban, it was a failure, as tantra continued on in the years after 1993.
...
There’s more, but most of it falls along the lines of me not really getting on board with your categories like Consensus Buddhism and lefty secular ethics; they seem too loosely defined. So when you say that Consensus Buddhist ethics *IS* lefty secular ethics, I find myself very much lost and admittedly a bit baffled by those who – at least in their silence – accept this equation."
Mijn kritiek (naast m'n waardering voor z'n onbevangen tekst) is:
a. Dat hij het vooral lijkt te hebben over opvattingen over ethiek en veel minder over ethisch gedrag; ik wil niet zeggen dat consensus-boeddhisten' zich beter gedragen van Californische lefties (en Nederlandse geestverwanten); maar de nadruk op het oefenen, het proberen ethisch te zijn ontbreekt.
b. Dat hij niet duidelijk maakt want in het boeddhisme de functie van ethisch gedrag is. Niet om (goddelijke) straf te voorkomen of (hemelse) beloning te krijgen maar als middel om wijsheid en inzicht te verkrijgen: een soteriologisch doel dus.
(Daarnaast staat z'n hele betoog tegelijk in het teken van het opwaarderen van tantra, en daar heb ik niets mee, dat is me veel te dionysisch. Vergelijk m'n blog apollinisch-of-dionysisch-boeddhisme )
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Bijlage 1 De mythe van de leraar en de 'lijn van opvolging'
Kritiek op de historische betrouwbaarheid van het lineage-denken in het algemeen is mooi beschreven door John R. McRae in 'Seeing through Zen: Encounter, Transformation, and Genealogy in Chinese Chan Buddhism ', Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. Zie als klikbaar plaatje zijn 'Rules of Zen studies .
In het vroege boeddhisme, in de Pali Canon en in Theravada speelt de leraar ook een rol. Vooral de Boeddha zelf als leraar dan; maar ook wel de senior-monnik.
Maar vooral toch is de leer de leraar
Duidelijk wordt dat verwoord in twee citaten uit de Maha Parinibbana Sutta (Digha Nikaya 16):
“ 2.26. Wees daarom, Ananda, als een eiland voor jullie zelf, een toevlucht voor jullie zelf, zoek geen externe toevlucht. Met de Dhamma als jullie eiland, met de Dhamma als jullie toevlucht, zoek geen andere toevlucht.
en
6.1. En de Heer zei tegen de Eerwaarde Ananda: "Het kan zijn, Ananda, dat in sommigen van jullie de gedachte opkomt: 'De instructies van de Meester zijn er niet meer; wij hebben geen Leraar meer.' Maar zo, Ananda, moet dat niet worden gezien. Want, Ananda, dat wat ik verkondigd heb en bekend gemaakt heb als de Dhamma en de Discipline, dat zal jullie Leraar zijn nadat ik ben heengegaan." Bron: hier
Eerder opgenomen in m'n blogtekst uit april 2013
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Bijlage 2 'What's Ethics Got to Do with It? door Richard Payne
The misguided debate about mindfulness and morality
As mindfuness has made greater inroads into public life—from hospitals, to schools, to the workplace—its growing distance from Buddhist thought and practice has become a hotly contested issue. Is mindfulness somehow deficient because it lacks Buddhist ethics, and should Buddhist ethics be replicated in mindfulness programs and workshops?
Psychologist Lynette Monteiro, founder of the Ottawa Mindfulness Clinic, points out that the “seeming absence of the explicit teaching of ethics in the MBI [Mindfulness-based Intervention] curriculum” is the “thorniest” basis for criticism. Underlying the discussion of ethics in mindfulness, however, is the presumption that there exists an inherent relation between religion and morality. Yet this focus on morality—thought to define the practice as religious rather than secular, Buddhist rather than non-Buddhist—is based on Western presumptions about religion inherited from Christianity, not Buddhism.
Views on morality and mindfulness tend to fall into three categories: inherent, integral, and modular.
The argument for an inherent relation claims that mindfulness training by itself, without any instruction in morality, leads people to higher moral standing. This is the claim made, for example, by David DeSteno, who says that an eight-week instructional program in meditation—without any accompanying instruction in morality—increased compassionate responses to the suffering of others threefold.
An integral relation, on the other hand, is one in which mindfulness and morality are understood to be inseparable, and the specific morality of the Buddhist tradition is thought to already form a part of mindfulness training. In this view, the success of mindfulness tradition requires practitioners to change their moral orientation to the world in specific—that is, Buddhist—ways.
Finally, a modular relation views mindfulness training and morality as distinct and separate, existing independently of one another. Separate modules like mindfulness training and training in morality can be linked together like Legos to create different structures. Under this conception, the kind of morality attached could just as well be Christian or humanist as Buddhist.
Mindfulness researchers and proponents alike have become entrenched in well-defined and increasingly institutionalized positions regarding ethics. But the fundamental ground of each of these positions—the way in which Western culture conceives of religion—has been ignored. That conception is built on a basic narrative trajectory that leads from primal, blissful harmony in Paradise, through sinful disobedience and ejection from Paradise, to a final atonement and reconciliation. This biblical narrative is fundamentally ethical in nature, hinging as it does on sinful action as the cause for the fall from grace. Many in the Western Buddhist communities have absorbed this cultural identification of religion with morality uncritically and perhaps unconsciously. It is, after all, an assumption so well established as to be invisible to us.
Yet if we look at the Buddhist narrative structure, we find it follows quite a different trajectory. Humanity’s original condition is not one of blissful harmony but rather of ignorance repeatedly leading to suffering. Recognizing this sets one on the path to awakening.
This fundamental difference between the two traditions suggests that the emphasis on morality in present discussions of mindfulness is rooted not in the Buddhist tradition itself but in the cultural preconceptions of Euro-American society.
This is not, of course, to say that the Buddhist tradition does not value morality, only that morality does not play the salvifically central role that it does in Christianity. Rather than being the key to attaining redemption for one’s original sinful failing, morality constitutes a condition for effective practice in Buddhism. After all, in the Buddhist tradition, while morality is conducive to awakening, it is not considered sufficient. Instead, it is a necessary preliminary. ...
These values and presumptions also inform the self-improvement culture of our society within which mindfulness training—in both secular and Buddhist forms—exists. The strong moral imperative to improve oneself has its origins in Protestant religious culture, which promoted the exercise of self-control to overcome one’s inherently sinful nature.
The moral imperative toward self-improvement is evident in the negative views held toward people who are not running, dieting, learning a foreign language, meditating, doing yoga, or any of the several dozen other ways society offers for you to improve yourself. Certainly, anyone not involved in such activities is thought to be lazy, stupid, indolent, and—studies surely suggest—will die younger and suffer more than all of those pursuing self-improvement.
One of the strongest motivators for individuals to pursue mindfulness is this imperative toward self-betterment. But such a moral imperative is not wholly consistent with Buddhist thought. Unlike Protestantism, the Buddhist path does not involve a moral control being exerted over the self and its natural animalistic tendencies, but rather the development of greater insight into the conditioned nature of existence. Indeed, the dualism of a self controlling the self feeds the illusion of a separate, independently existing self.
It is this modern moral imperative toward self-improvement that has transformed Buddhist practices from the activities of a relatively small number of monastic specialists into mass-marketed lay workshops, trainings, books, online courses, and so on. Just as the monastic values of late medieval Christian Europe became generalized as appropriate for everyone, so now the monastic values of Buddhism are being propagated and marketed as part of how one can improve oneself. ...
Instead, highlighting the contradictions between the cultural presumptions that regard morality as the key to salvation and morality’s role within the Buddhist framework might challenge participants in the debate to question why it has become such a hot-button issue. After all, unless the debate changes the ground of shared presumptions, the existing impasse will only become more deeply entrenched.
Bron: Tricycle mei 2015
1 opmerking:
Dit is de kern van de zaak, Joop; dus toch nog een lichtpuntje bij David Chapman: "Emptiness, form, and ethics: The Buddhist idea that form and emptiness are inseparable may help resolve the Western crisis of postmodernity, the impasse between ethical eternalism and ethical nihilism, and the uselessness of contemporary moral philosophy."
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